By Peter Tsouras
4/11/2016 • Military History Magazine
China determined that Vietnam, heady with its victory in the American War, must be taught a lesson.
Deng Xiaoping, China’s diminutive leader, had good reason by late 1978 to view Vietnam’s victory in the American War (1959-75) as a threat to China’s security. Vietnam had clearly chosen the Soviet Union – China’s main enemy – as its patron, was actively oppressing Vietnam’s Chinese minority, had committed violent border provocations, and in November had invaded Cambodia to eradicate China’s Khmer Rouge clients. Meanwhile the USSR was massively building up forces on China’s northern border.
For Deng, this situation – although ominous – was ripe with opportunities. A punitive strike against Vietnam would make the Vietnamese more reasonable, show Soviet patronage to be worthless, and expose the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) leadership as hopelessly inadequate. Deng’s well-reasoned strategy to modernize China required the removal of obstructionist Maoist PLA cadres. He scandalized the Maoists by asking, “What does a dead 19th-century German Jew [Karl Marx] have to teach China?” Combat with the Vietnamese would be the PLA’s blood test.
In early January 1979 Deng visited the United States, verifying that the Americans would stand aside in case of a Sino-Vietnamese conflict. Events in Cambodia dictated the timing. The Vietnamese took Phnom Pen on January 7, and on January 14 they reached the Thai border. On February 15 China abrogated its 30-year alliance with Vietnam and announced its intention “to teach Vietnam a lesson.” Two days later the PLA poured across Vietnam’s northern border.
The timing of the attack favored China: It was just before the rainy season blanketed the Vietnamese border, and nearly coincident with the spring thaw in China’s north that mired Soviet mechanized armies massed there. Deng had balanced the PLA’s infirmities against the fact that most of Vietnam’s field army, the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN), was in Cambodia. Only 70,000 soldiers in a few regular and border guard divisions remained in Vietnam; however, as many as 100,000 troops in 3,500-man reconstruction divisions were also in the country, and these were toughened combat veterans.
In the pre-dawn hours of February 17, the spearheads of a PLA force of 200,000 men in 20 divisions supported by 400 tanks and 1,500 artillery pieces attacked in the direction of five regional capitals. Fully aware of Vietnam’s combat experienced modern air defense system, the PLA kept its aircraft grounded.
It was very much a conventional operation, with the Chinese attacking down major roads, overrunning population centers, and seizing the controlling high ground. The PLA relied on human wave attacks, likely losing 3,000 men in the first few days as the Vietnamese infiltrated and raided behind PLA lines. In one example of the deadliness of these tactics, a Vietnamese female sniper killed eight PLA tank commanders. When the commanders’ outraged crewmen caught her, they pinned her to the ground and crushed her beneath the treads of their tanks.
Chinese artillery was outranged and outfought by the more modern and experienced (Soviet-manufactured) Vietnamese guns that pounded PLA troop concentrations and slowmoving columns. The PLA lost at least 100 tanks to the enemy’s advanced Sagger antitank guided missiles. As if the attacking Chinese did not have enough problems with outmoded equipment, tactics and doctrines, they also suffered great friction caused by the absence of a clearly identified rank structure – a holdover of Maoist People’s War doctrine.
The PLA modified its operational goals to concentrate 70,000 men against the regional capital of Long Son, a strategic point controlling access to the Red River Delta and Hanoi. (See “History’s Top 10 Forgotten Victories,” March 2010 ACG.) Defending Long Son was the Vietnamese 3d Gold Star Division. The PLA drove the division back toward the city, which had been fortified for just such an event. On February 27 the PLA seized the dominant terrain north of Long Son with a tank-infantry assault preceded by a massive artillery strike. Within a few days the Vietnamese were surrounded, and on March 2 the PLA closed in for the kill. During three days of ruthless house-to-house fighting, the Chinese wiped out the Gold Star Division and reduced Long Son to rubble. On March 5 the capture of the high ground south of the city opened up the vital Red River Delta to invasion. Beijing, however, then announced that enough punishment had been administered and ordered a withdrawal that was completed in 10 days.
Neither side advertised its casualties. The PLA admitted to 7,000 dead and 15,000 wounded, but Western estimates ran as high as 28,000 Chinese dead and 43,000 wounded. Vietnam did not release casualty figures other than widely publicizing 100,000 Vietnamese civilian deaths. The PLA’s “scorched-earth” campaign that left a swath of destruction in its path gave some credence to Vietnam’s claimed civilian toll.
Although the Vietnamese remained pugnacious – a national trait – the war made clear that their Soviet patron would not fight to defend them. The USSR’s only contribution to the conflict was a supply airlift. Deng had bluffed and called, and the Soviets folded.
Obviously the PLA accomplished its mission, but the Vietnamese had taught the Chinese a lesson on the battlefield – one that Deng used for his own larger purpose. The lessons of the war allowed Deng to sweep out the ossified Maoist old guard and embark on the modernization and professionalization of the PLA. The result today is technologically advanced, operationally sound and strategically sophisticated Chinese armed forces to match the country’s emergence as an economic giant.
Peter Tsouras is a military intelligence analyst for the Defense Intelligence Agency and the author/editor of 24 books
ဦးေၾကာင္ၾကီး
6 comments
ဦးကြောင်ကြီး
August 21, 2017 at 11:17 am
မူရင်းစာ။ ။။။။။
War of the Dragons: The Sino-Vietnamese War, 1979
By Peter Tsouras
4/11/2016 • Military History Magazine
China determined that Vietnam, heady with its victory in the American War, must be taught a lesson.
Deng Xiaoping, China’s diminutive leader, had good reason by late 1978 to view Vietnam’s victory in the American War (1959-75) as a threat to China’s security. Vietnam had clearly chosen the Soviet Union – China’s main enemy – as its patron, was actively oppressing Vietnam’s Chinese minority, had committed violent border provocations, and in November had invaded Cambodia to eradicate China’s Khmer Rouge clients. Meanwhile the USSR was massively building up forces on China’s northern border.
For Deng, this situation – although ominous – was ripe with opportunities. A punitive strike against Vietnam would make the Vietnamese more reasonable, show Soviet patronage to be worthless, and expose the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) leadership as hopelessly inadequate. Deng’s well-reasoned strategy to modernize China required the removal of obstructionist Maoist PLA cadres. He scandalized the Maoists by asking, “What does a dead 19th-century German Jew [Karl Marx] have to teach China?” Combat with the Vietnamese would be the PLA’s blood test.
In early January 1979 Deng visited the United States, verifying that the Americans would stand aside in case of a Sino-Vietnamese conflict. Events in Cambodia dictated the timing. The Vietnamese took Phnom Pen on January 7, and on January 14 they reached the Thai border. On February 15 China abrogated its 30-year alliance with Vietnam and announced its intention “to teach Vietnam a lesson.” Two days later the PLA poured across Vietnam’s northern border.
The timing of the attack favored China: It was just before the rainy season blanketed the Vietnamese border, and nearly coincident with the spring thaw in China’s north that mired Soviet mechanized armies massed there. Deng had balanced the PLA’s infirmities against the fact that most of Vietnam’s field army, the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN), was in Cambodia. Only 70,000 soldiers in a few regular and border guard divisions remained in Vietnam; however, as many as 100,000 troops in 3,500-man reconstruction divisions were also in the country, and these were toughened combat veterans.
In the pre-dawn hours of February 17, the spearheads of a PLA force of 200,000 men in 20 divisions supported by 400 tanks and 1,500 artillery pieces attacked in the direction of five regional capitals. Fully aware of Vietnam’s combat experienced modern air defense system, the PLA kept its aircraft grounded.
It was very much a conventional operation, with the Chinese attacking down major roads, overrunning population centers, and seizing the controlling high ground. The PLA relied on human wave attacks, likely losing 3,000 men in the first few days as the Vietnamese infiltrated and raided behind PLA lines. In one example of the deadliness of these tactics, a Vietnamese female sniper killed eight PLA tank commanders. When the commanders’ outraged crewmen caught her, they pinned her to the ground and crushed her beneath the treads of their tanks.
Chinese artillery was outranged and outfought by the more modern and experienced (Soviet-manufactured) Vietnamese guns that pounded PLA troop concentrations and slowmoving columns. The PLA lost at least 100 tanks to the enemy’s advanced Sagger antitank guided missiles. As if the attacking Chinese did not have enough problems with outmoded equipment, tactics and doctrines, they also suffered great friction caused by the absence of a clearly identified rank structure – a holdover of Maoist People’s War doctrine.
The PLA modified its operational goals to concentrate 70,000 men against the regional capital of Long Son, a strategic point controlling access to the Red River Delta and Hanoi. (See “History’s Top 10 Forgotten Victories,” March 2010 ACG.) Defending Long Son was the Vietnamese 3d Gold Star Division. The PLA drove the division back toward the city, which had been fortified for just such an event. On February 27 the PLA seized the dominant terrain north of Long Son with a tank-infantry assault preceded by a massive artillery strike. Within a few days the Vietnamese were surrounded, and on March 2 the PLA closed in for the kill. During three days of ruthless house-to-house fighting, the Chinese wiped out the Gold Star Division and reduced Long Son to rubble. On March 5 the capture of the high ground south of the city opened up the vital Red River Delta to invasion. Beijing, however, then announced that enough punishment had been administered and ordered a withdrawal that was completed in 10 days.
Neither side advertised its casualties. The PLA admitted to 7,000 dead and 15,000 wounded, but Western estimates ran as high as 28,000 Chinese dead and 43,000 wounded. Vietnam did not release casualty figures other than widely publicizing 100,000 Vietnamese civilian deaths. The PLA’s “scorched-earth” campaign that left a swath of destruction in its path gave some credence to Vietnam’s claimed civilian toll.
Although the Vietnamese remained pugnacious – a national trait – the war made clear that their Soviet patron would not fight to defend them. The USSR’s only contribution to the conflict was a supply airlift. Deng had bluffed and called, and the Soviets folded.
Obviously the PLA accomplished its mission, but the Vietnamese had taught the Chinese a lesson on the battlefield – one that Deng used for his own larger purpose. The lessons of the war allowed Deng to sweep out the ossified Maoist old guard and embark on the modernization and professionalization of the PLA. The result today is technologically advanced, operationally sound and strategically sophisticated Chinese armed forces to match the country’s emergence as an economic giant.
Peter Tsouras is a military intelligence analyst for the Defense Intelligence Agency and the author/editor of 24 books
ဦးကျောက်ခဲ
August 21, 2017 at 11:35 am
ကျောင်းနေဘက် သူငယ်ချင်း ဗထက်ချိုက် တစ်ယောက်ရှိတယ်…
သူ့အဖေက အမေရိကန် – ဗီယက်နမ် စစ်ပွဲမှာမပါဘူး …
အလုပ်ခွင်/ပညာ ထူးချွန်လို့ စစ်ပြီးရင် ပြန်လည်ထူထောင်ရေးအတွက်…
ဟိုချီမင်းက ဆိုဗီယက်ကို ပညာတော်သင်ပို့ထားတဲ့ အုပ်စုဝင်ပေါ့…
ဒါပေမဲ့ တရုတ် – ဗီယက်နမ် ချတော့ သူ့အဖေပါသတဲ့ …
ဗထက်ချိုက်တွေ တရုတ်ကို မုန်းတာတော့ တူးတူးခါးခါးပဲ …
မင်းတို့နဲ့ တရုတ်တွေ အတော်တူတယ်လို့ပြောရင်တောင် စိတ်ဆိုးတယ်…
kai
August 21, 2017 at 2:15 pm
မြန်မာတွေအနေနဲ့.. ချိုင်းနားနဲ့ ကွဲကွဲပြားပြားဖြစ်.. တိုင်းပြည်လုံခြုံရေး.. အကျိုးစီးပွားအတွက်.. လုပ်ချင်ရင်… ချိုင်းနား(China) ကို တရုတ်ပြည်လို့ခေါ်တာကို ပြင်ဖို့လိုသလို.. ချိုင်းနီးစ်(Chinese) တွေကို.. တရုတ်တွေလို့ခေါ်တာလည်း ပြင်ရမယ်လို့ယူဆတယ်..။
အဲလိုက မစ,လို့ကတော့.. ကြိုက်တာရေး.. ကြိုက်တာလုပ်.. တာ့တာပဲ..။
မြန်မာပြည်ထဲမွေးတဲ့ မျိုးရိုး ၃-၄ဆက်သမားတွေပါ တရုတ်တွေလို့ခေါ်ကြပြီး.. ချိုင်းနားပြည်ကြီးထဲက.. လူသန်း၁၂၀ဝ ကိုလည်း တရုတ်တွေလို့ သွားခေါ်နေကြမှတော့.. ဘယ်ကဘယ်လို.. ဘာများဆက်လုပ်နိုင်ကြမှာလည်း သိချင်မိ..
မြန်မာ့မြေတင်မက.. လူတွေကိုပါ.. ချိုင်းနားလက်အောက်ခံပြည်နယ်အဖြစ် အတင်းထိုးပေးနေသူများ အလိုလိုဖြစ်နေသပေါ့..။
ရယ်စရာ.. အာဟိ.. ကွိ.. ကွိ..။ :v
သင့်အေးရိပ်
August 21, 2017 at 3:47 pm
တရုတ်ကြောင်နဲ့ ဗမာကြောင်ရဲ့ ကွာခြားချက်လေး သိပါရစေခညာ
:k:
Foreign Resident
August 21, 2017 at 4:16 pm
အမှန်က တရုတ်ကြီးဟာ ကမာ္ဘ့စစ်အင်အားကြီး နိုင်ငံဖြစ်ချင်ရင် ၊
၄ / ၅ နှစ် တစ်ခါလောက် စစ်ပွဲအသေးစားလေးတွေရှာပြီး လက်သွေးသင့်နေပြီ ။
တရုတ်ကြီးမှာ ၄ နှစ် တစ်ခါ စစ်ပွဲအတွက်လည်း ပိုက်ဆံတွေ ပိုနေပြီဘဲဟာ ။
အနည်းဆုံး လူဝင်မတိုက်ရင်တောင် မြန်မာပြည်လို နိုင်ငံ တစ်ခုခုက ၊
သူပုန်တွေကို လက်နက်အသစ်တွေ ပေးပြီး လက်နက် စမ်းသပ်သင့်နေပြီ ။
အရင်ကကျော်စွာဦးကြီးမိုက်
August 29, 2017 at 9:42 am
Foreign Resident says:
မြန်မာပြည်လို နိုင်ငံ တစ်ခုခုက ၊
သူပုန်တွေကို လက်နက်အသစ်တွေ ပေးပြီး လက်နက် စမ်းသပ်သင့်နေပြီ ။
ခုလည်းတရုတ်ကမြန်မာစစ်တပ်ရော သူပုန်တွေကိုပါလက်နက်ရောင်းနေတာပဲမဟုတ်လား